Showing posts with label Real Estate. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Real Estate. Show all posts

Sunday, October 13, 2013

風暴後 - 熱錢由西轉東

由於熱錢進入大馬產業市場,大馬的房屋價格指數,從2009年第4季至2012年第4季開始顯著上揚,按年成長從2009年第4季的5.6%,揚升至2012年第4季的12.2%。

另外,屋價繼續在2013年首季與次季上揚,不過,揚升步伐較緩慢,分別只是揚升10.7%與7.8%。
次貸風暴美屋價跌30%
2007至2008年美國次貸風暴引發的全球金融危機,這項危機是因為“超額”貸款給不符合資格的借貸者而引起,造成房產泡沫在2006年杪達到高峰狀態。
泡沫的爆破是因為利率調升所致,2009年,美國屋價指數比2006年高峰水平大約下跌30%,到了2013年3月,依然維持在2009年的水平。
英國屋價高峰回跌
1999至2007年,英國的平均屋價,從7萬5千英鎊,上揚至18萬2千英鎊(全國屋價指數),還有從7萬7千英鎊,上漲至19萬6千英鎊(英國Halifax房價指數)。不過,該2大指數在2008年分別下跌4.4%與5.2%。
上海和香港房價攀高峰
全球金融危機發生後,海外直接投資流向亞洲的數量達到最高峰,中國、香港、新加坡、馬來西亞皆意識到從2010年起,海外資金的流入顯著增加。
上海與香港的產業指數也在2012年達到最高峰,不過,在這期間,香港的屋價從2000年開始下跌,然後在2004年從低點回揚,上海的住宅產業指數則在2007與2008年呈高原走勢。
大馬屋價上漲10因素
2000年至今,馬來西亞的住宅產業價格處於上揚趨勢,全國所有房屋價格指數顯示,按年成長率介於1.1%至11.8%。
隨著熱錢進入大馬產業市場,國內的房屋價格指數,從2009年第4季至2012年第四季開始顯著上揚,按年成長從2009年第四季的5.6%,揚升至2012年第4季的12.2%。
另外,2013年首季與次季屋價繼續上揚,不過,揚升步伐較緩慢,分別只是10.7%與7.8%。
財政部估價與產業服務組副總監費占阿都拉曼指出,2001年首季至2010年第二季,大馬的屋價按年增長3.4%,屋價上漲主要原因分別是:
*經濟成長平穩
*人口結構改變
*消費價格指數通膨
*生產商價格指數
*貸款借貸率
*產業盈利稅與消費者基本因素
另外,從2010年第三季至2012年第四季,屋價持續走高,平均上揚9.9%,造成屋價上漲的額外因素包括:
*岸外的熱錢
*擁有其他亞洲國家的樂觀基本面
*進出產業市場門檻低
*投機活動
3區屋價已難負擔
費占說,2009年至今,大馬特別是巴生河流域、新山及檳島的屋價,已上升至超出大多數人的可負擔能力;儘管如此,一些買家繼續購買產業,他們深信或是擔心,屋價會繼續上漲。
話雖然這樣說,屋價的上漲並非概括大馬各州,主要是局限在巴生河流域、新山及檳島,其他地點的屋價只是適度揚升。
不過,政府也在這期間採取一些降低房產的措施,例如在2010年實施較嚴謹的貸款指南,第三間房屋的貸款比率,最高頂限為屋價的70%。
此外,2012年發出的指示,房屋貸款的批准是以凈收入為准,就是扣除其他貸款分期、公積金、所得稅之後的凈收入。
另一方面,2013年當局發出新指示:貸款的最高攤還期只能是35年,假如屋價繼續保持偏高水平,政府可能採取嚴謹的管制措施。(星洲日報/投資致富‧地產街‧文:鄭碧娥)

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

[转贴] 高房價的幕後推手

細讀房產廣告,可以發現稍微像樣的房產,起碼70萬令吉起跳,面積皆不超過1千平方尺。所以,若你身邊的朋友,30歲了,還是“無殼蝸牛”亦不足為奇,因為以大馬人目前的薪資水平,要在市區負擔一個像樣的房子,可能還得“聯營”才行。
如果你問市場所謂的“專業”人士,大馬產業價是否不合理?這些人士都會告訴你,原料價起了、城市地段不多了、年輕人口增加了、大馬房產價的歷來增幅不及區域……,一副“在基本面支撐下非常合理”的模樣,還可能隨時補上一句“再不買,就更貴了。”
但是,似乎沒有人告訴你,如果你的薪水一直原地踏步,跟著眾人拼了老命去追高房價,一旦熱錢退潮,房產價格的漲勢可能停頓,若國家銀行升息,貸款成本馬上增加,如有人應付不了房貸,恐怕引發骨牌效應,房產市場可能盤整。
熱錢四處流竄的時刻,在看房產基本面時,或許我們應先釐清,國行貸款上限等“雞毛蒜皮”的政策,對阻擾熱錢湧入房市根本微不足道,因為在發展商承擔利息計劃(DIBS)或其他特別方案之下,炒家只要付身家不到十分之一的定金,就可以達到“炒房”目的。
然而,聰明的“專業”人士,也從來不會這麼說,反過來,打著DIBS是為“無殼蝸牛”準備的貼心工具,從未道出,“羊毛出在羊身上”,置產人是在以未來的房價購置眼前的房產。
前陣子,市場傳出政府可能廢除DIBS,“專業”人士都發表了許多關於DIBS的偉論,然而,若該工具那麼好,新加坡又為何廢除呢?我也很想問“專業”人士,當熱錢蜂擁而至時,基本面又算甚麼?(星洲日報/財經小品:陳曉雯)

Friday, August 16, 2013

[转帖] 房地產的真相

一隻兔子月薪3萬,打算用200萬蓋一個自己的窩。
森林之王獅子不允許,說私自蓋就是違章建築,只能向灰太狼買。

灰太狼是搞房地產的,先用100萬向獅子取得開發權,
再用300萬元向獅子買這塊地,投資200萬元把兔子窩蓋好,向兔子要價1200萬元。

兔子拿不出這麼多錢,於是向狐狸借1000萬元,分20年分期還清,
總共連本帶利1500萬!兔子全家二十年都等於為狐狸打工。

獅子、狐狸都賺了錢,只有兔子虧,連兔寶寶也不敢生了。
兔子愈來愈少,獅子覺得這樣下去大家沒肉吃,於是出手「打房」。
獅子非常重視兔窩價格太貴的問題,發布了新政策措施以打壓。

獅子認定兔窩價格賣得太高的原因:是因為有的兔子買了兔窩後,自己不住炒房所致!
獅子惡罵一聲:「這些小兔崽子,我一定要好好管一管」。

於是規定:「兔子買了兔窩如果2年內又賣了,要向獅子交納10~15%的奢侈稅。」

大多數沒有窩的兔子都很高興,以為兔窩會變便宜,
一開始價格先跌,借錢炒房的兔子急著賣,但灰太狼們財大氣粗,他們早就賺飽了!

知道2012年選完以後,大陸來的有錢肥兔也要來台置產,所以他們守住菁華地段,
先炒菁華店面及A級商辦,如南京東路及敦化北路口的台北金融中心大樓,
現在就喊價每坪135萬天價,結果兔窩價格沒降下來,獅子卻發了大財。

獅子又對狐狸說:「只借錢給首先交了更多頭期款的兔子,
並提高兔子們的利息,多買兔窩的不准借,全部只能付現金。」
這樣狐狸又發了財,灰太狼以更高的價格向獅子買地,
並轉嫁到兔窩價格上,加價後賣給兔子。

獅子辛苦地為自己操勞,兔子很感謝獅子,但還是發現兔窩價格愈來愈貴。

獅子說:「這事挺複雜,還真不太好辦,不過兔子們放心,
我們將繼續打房,將向已經有兔窩的徵稅…」

麻煩大家告訴大家,因為有些兔子還不太明白....

The Asian housing bubble-burst








Residential property prices in many countries of developing Asia shot up after the global financial crisis, but recent trends suggest that they may be declining.

May 27, 2013: Everyone knows the role played by housing bubbles in the pre-crisis booms that ended in spectacular crashes in the United States in 2008, as well as in other countries like the UK and Ireland, and then Spain. But many commentators still persist in seeing this as more of a developed economy problem, which is less likely to become a concern in developing countries where excess demand for housing remains an issue.

In fact, however, it is just as possible for debt-driven private consumption bubbles to burst in developing countries – and several developing country financial crises have resulted from precisely that in the past. The experience of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, in which excess private indebtedness played a big role in causing the crisis in South Korea and Thailand, had provided a salutary lesson to most of developing Asia in the subsequent decade.

So it could have been expected that allowing excessive private credit expansion, especially for private retail credit for housing, automobiles and other consumption, is something that would be anathema to Asian countries, especially those that had already gone through one round of devastating financial crises. Yet, in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, many Asian developing countries actually encouraged the growth of consumer credit bubbles as a means to more rapid recovery, accentuating a process that had already been eased by financial liberalisation from 1999 onwards.

Heavy explosionThe result has been an explosion in heavily leveraged consumption as well as in residential real estate activity, even in economies where wage incomes have not increased that much, such as the Republic of Korea. And the impact has been most strongly felt in the housing market. From early 2009, as Charts 1 and 2 show, residential prices in several Asian economies soared dramatically for at least two years.

This has been most evident in Hong Kong, where house prices have more than doubled since early 2009. In 2012, when global residential real estate prices increased by around 4 per cent, prices in Hong Kong rose by 24 per cent. It is now the most expensive place on earth, with property prices significantly higher than in New York, London or Shanghai. Of course, Hong Kong house prices are substantially affected by non-resident purchases (by mainland Chinese as well as expatriate westerners), so they do not reflect the same internal factors that are shaping real estate markets elsewhere in the region. That may be why house prices here have continued to increase even when the rest of the East Asian region shows signs of slowing down and why it has remained impervious to various policy measures designed to cool the overheated market.

By contrast, the authorities in China have been working to quell the frothy housing market ever since early 2010, and to some extent they seem to have succeeded, as average house prices have remained largely flat for the past two years.

Tapering off effectIn some other countries in East Asia, house prices have tapered off or even started declining, independent of any policy nudging, but simply because the bubble has finally burst. This is clearly evident for Taipei China and Malaysia (Chart 2), but even in South Korea and Indonesia, the rate of increase has come down significantly. As Chart 3 suggests, only in Hong Kong did the rate of increase further accelerate. Elsewhere, even in places where the prices continued to increase, they did so at a slower rate, including in India's Mumbai, where the rate of increase was still quite high.

In fact, in the past year (as indicated in Chart 4) house prices in Shanghai and Singapore increased less than the general rate of inflation, so they declined in real terms. In other places like Taipei, they barely increased in real terms. The indicators for the first quarter of 2013 are that housing continues to increase in prices across much of Asia, but at significantly slower rates, and in some countries they have started declining.

But while the rapid increase in residential real estate prices clearly suggested housing bubbles in many Asian countries, the bursting of the bubble need not be good news, and can have painful consequences. As in the US housing market before 2007, most of the increase in real estate prices in these Asian economies was debt-driven, resulting from the rapid expansion of retail credit to households, which in turn dominated in total personal debt. As Chart 5 shows, credit to the private sector increased dramatically in many of these economies.

Substantial increaseThe most substantial increase has been in Hong Kong, which is also home to the frothiest property market of them all. But all the countries shown in Chart 5 have private credit to GDP ratios in excess of 100 per cent, which has usually meant an inevitable day of reckoning at some point, usually with unpleasant implications. Indeed, the household sector is already facing personal debt crises in several countries, notably South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. And this is turn is already acting as a drag on the economy, as households that increasingly find it difficult to service their debts are forced to deleverage and cut consumption.

Chart 6 shows that household debt has very clearly reached crisis levels in some economies. In Malaysia, total household debt in 2012 amounted to more than 80 per cent of GDP and a shocking 140 per cent of personal disposable income – clearly, therefore an unsustainable level that will have to be reduced sooner or later. In South Korea and Singapore, the corresponding ratios in 2012 were around 90 per cent and more than 100 per cent – once again suggesting that this state of affairs is not likely to be able to persist for long. In South Korea, total indebtedness of the government, companies and households is currently 283 per cent – significantly more than the 227 per cent that existed just prior to the Asian Financial Crisis in 2007.

So this is a bubble – or rather, a set of bubbles – waiting to burst. Indeed, some are already in the process of bursting. Debt levels across the economy are rising beyond the ability of the various debtors to service them. Housing debt is just one of the problem areas. In the case of other forms of personal debt – such as credit card debt, debt to finance purchases of vehicles and student debt – there are similar and growing concerns about the capacity of borrowers to repay.

As these factors cause consumer spending to slow down, this is already affecting companies, and causing their debt to become more difficult to service. The corporate bond market, which had become incredibly buoyant in emerging Asia in the recent past, is also becoming a cause for worry.

All this makes the East Asian region's economies ever more vulnerable to external shocks. But with these levels of indebtedness, the shocks that cause the next round of damage may even come from within.

Experience Gain from 1997 home prices crash in Hong Kong

In 1997, home prices in Hong Kong were in its final run-up to the all-time high which were unmatched even today.
Then it crashed as the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis.
What can you learn from the experience in Hong Kong?

And what does it imply for the housing market in the United States?


Centa-city Leading Index, showing home prices from 1997 to 2004, Source: Centaline

Home Prices in Hong Kong dropped 60-70% over that 6-year period after the Asian Financial Crisis. Although there were some growth in some of the years within this period, overall Hong Kong people suffered. After the financial crisis, there were years of deflation, and overall economy was extremely weak. Even though there were some growth, surely Hong Kong people couldn’t feel any.

Why? Why did the financial crisis caused 6 years of protracted home prices decline in Hong Kong. Reinhart and Rogoff found that in history, a financial/banking crisis would cause the real estate bubble to burst and fall for, on average, 6 years.

We don’t need any sophisticated economic theories to explain why such real estate bubble and its subsequent burst is so toxic. Real estate bubbles are inevitably accompanied by high leverage, as there are usually not many people who can really pay off the whole home price without any borrowing. In the time of real estate boom, banks are happy to lend because value of the collateral, i.e. home, increase in value, giving a false sense of safety. As more and more people lend, and as value of homes increase, an over-leverage condition would happen.

There are no bubbles that will not burst. When real estate bubble burst, home prices decrease, thus what seemed to be a very comfortable gearing would now become dangerous as the value of collateral falls. What is worse, the burst of the bubble often directly or indirectly lead to economic recession, pushing unemployment up, etc. For people who find themselves unable to make their mortgage payments, they are in default. If this became a system-wide default, Banks will have to make massive provisions for loan losses, thus compromising the capital position, tightening the credit. For those who are still able to pay, and pay, and at the same time because of the fall in their homes’ value, they might be in negative equity, i.e. the mortgages outstanding are more than the market value of their homes. The wealth effect would naturally lead them to spend less to pay mortgages, and save more.

This in turn would depress the consumption because people are spending less. This will lead to slower recovery, and as the aggregate demand for consumption is low under such condition, the risk for deflation would be high.

That is what happened in Hong Kong after 1997, and it took 6 years for the economy to recover to full strength. This is lucky, because economies like Japan has never quite recovered.

So what can you make of the experience of Hong Kong?